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tuses, the present article argues that the latest developments in the area of data tech-
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proposals for amendments to the EURODAC Regulation, a database that regulates the 
asylum fingerprint system in the EU. This is revealing of the ongoing broadening of 
the purpose of that data and law enforcement access to the collected information. The 
argument finds its basis in three main trends common to these databases: the erosion 
of the principle of purpose limitation, the widening of access to data by law enforce-
ment authorities, and the digitalisation of borders through biometrics. Ultimately, 
this article claims that the level of surveillance of certain categories of migrants that 
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1. Introduction
The so-called EU migration crisis came to prominence in 2014 and 2015 
due to conflict and violence in a number of different countries including 
Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. A mass influx of refugees arrived at the shores 
of the European Union (in 2015 one million asylum seekers)1 and these 
events prompted the EU Commission to develop a European Agenda on 
Migration aimed at addressing the challenges that Europe was facing at 
the time (and is still facing today, although the numbers are not as high as 
they were at the peak of this crisis). Efficient border management through 
better use of IT systems and technologies was one of the top policy priori-
ties for the Commission at this stage. By making full use of these systems 
the EU wanted not only to improve border management, but also to reduce 
irregular migration and return illegally staying third-country nationals.
First and foremost, borders are a form of expression of a State’s sover-
eignty. In the EU, borders have been gradually allocated new tasks after 
the implementation of the information exchange systems in the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice (hereafter AFJS) since the SIS in 1995. These 
new tasks are related primarily to the categorisation of migrants who want 
to enter the EU and migration governance. Furthermore, the introduction 
of information technology has also contributed to the “transformation of 
European borders to digital borders”,2 a process that is at the heart of the 
present study.
EU databases play a crucial role in the categorisation of migrants in 
Europe. The registration of people in EU databases and the storing of their 
fingerprints or other types of personal data catalogue those arriving in EU 
territory.3 However, the role of EU information systems is not limited to 
the collection of personal information on mobile third-country nation-
als. It also influences EU policy options that impact migration governance 
overall and migrants’ rights. The most recent modifications and proposals 
in the area of EU immigration databases have amplified their functions, 
1 Alexander Betts and Paul Collier, Refuge – Transforming a Broken Refugee System (London: 
Penguin Books, 2017), 2.
2 Michiel Besters and Frans WA Brom, “Greedy information technology: The digitalization of the 
European migration policy”, European Journal of Migration and Law 12 (2010): 456, and Louise 
Amoore, “Biometric borders: Governing mobilities in the war on terror”, Political Geography 25 
(2006): 336.
3 Dennis Broeders, “A European ‘border’ surveillance system under construction”, in Dijstelbloem 
Hubb and Meijer Albert (eds.), Migration and the New Technological Borders of Europe. Migration, 
Minorities and Citizenship (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 43.
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enlarged their purposes and increased the number of authorities with 
access to them (for instance as we will see in relation to EURODAC) for 
the purposes of fighting against terrorism and combatting serious crime. 
Such developments reflect EU’s concern in addressing the terrorist threat 
and enhancing security within the European territory through data sur-
veillance. Nevertheless, these initiatives have also brought problems with 
regard to the accuracy in the use of biometrics,4 the possibility of conflat-
ing asylum seeking with potential suspicion of crime, the erosion of the 
purpose limitation principle and in some cases unauthorised access to the 
databases.
Four centralised, large-scale EU databases must be mentioned in rela-
tion to the exchange of personal information of third-country nationals 
(and EU citizens in a lesser extent): a) the SIS/SIS II (Schengen Information 
System and the Second Generation Schengen Information System); b) the 
VIS (Visa Information System); c) EURODAC (European Dactylographic 
System); and d) EES (Entry Exit System), adopted in 2017 but operational 
only from 2020 (hereafter EES).
This study questions whether the development of EU databases in the 
AFJS, in particular EURODAC, could lead to questioning the lawfulness 
and proportionality of the further use of these databases.5 What is central 
is a reflection on how the latest developments in the area of AFJS data-
bases influence the categorisation of migrants under EU law, in particular 
asylum seekers. If European borders are “being transformed into digital 
borders”,6 how does this digitalisation of borders affect asylum seekers’ 
and irregular migrants’ statuses in the European Union?
In recent years there has been a significant increase in the personal data 
stored by these information databases, relating more and more to crime 
and law enforcement issues. The combination of the latter trends with 
broader access of law enforcement authorities to these information systems 
has contributed considerably to transforming their primary purposes. 
By carefully analysing how the change in their purpose has affected the 
4 Approximately 5% of the world population does not have fingerprints or their fingerprints are not 
readable by a machine, especially children and elderly people. 
5 Evelien Renate Brouwer, Digital Borders and Real Rights: Effective Remedies for Third-Country 
Nationals in the Schengen Information System, vol. 15 (Leyden: Brill, 2008), 144.
6 Besters and Brom, “Greedy information technology: The digitalization of the European migra-
tion policy”, 455.
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European migration regulation, it is argued that the “digital explosion”7 
plays a momentous role. The following aspects must be taken into account 
throughout the analysis of EURODAC and its impact in EU Migration 
Law:
(i) The erosion of the purpose limitation principle; 
(ii) Enhanced accessibility by law enforcement authorities to EU immi-
gration databases; 
(iii) The digitalisation of borders through biometrics.
2. EURODAC and the Common European Asylum System
The EURODAC was established by Council Regulation 2725/2000 (herein-
after EURODAC Regulation).8 This database, which became operational in 
January 2003, was designed to assist in the determination of which Member 
State is responsible for examining an asylum claim lodged in a Member 
State, in accordance with the conditions set out in the Dublin Regulation.9 
The Dublin Regulation aims to prevent so-called “asylum shopping”,10 and 
the EURODAC Regulation determines whether an individual has already 
sought sanctuary in another Member State. The UK and Ireland chose to 
be part of this Regulation that develops part of the Schengen Acquis; sim-
ilarly, Denmark and the Schengen Associated Countries are covered by 
the Dublin Regulation and EURODAC.11 Both the EURODAC Regulation 
and the amended Dublin Regulation (hereinafter Dublin III Regulation) 
are closely intertwined due to the fact that EURODAC is crucial for the 
7 Hal Abelson, Ken Ledeen and Harry R Lewis, Blown to Bits: Your Life, Liberty, and Happiness 
after the Digital Explosion (Addison-Wesley Professional, 2008).
8 Article 1 (1) of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 2725/2000 concerning the establishment of 
“Eurodac” for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention, 
[2000], OJ L 316/1. This Regulation became operational in 2003 (hereafter EURODAC Regulation).
9 Ibid., Recitals 2 and 3.
10 Asylum shopping can be one of two situations. Firstly, the abusive practice of claiming asylum 
in more than one Member State and, secondly, the “comparison and selection of one asylum rule 
among several”. All in all it is when asylum seekers apply for asylum in more than one EU State or 
choose one EU State in preference to others on the basis of a perceived higher standard of reception 
condition. For a more comprehensive note on the second meaning of “asylum shopping”: Ségolène 
Barbou des Places, “Evolution of asylum legislation in the EU: Insights from regulatory competi-
tion theory”, RSCAS Working Paper 16 (2003), 3-7.
11 Jorrit Rijpma, Building borders: The regulatory framework for the management of the external 
borders of the European Union, PhD dissertation, European University Institute, Florence, 2009, 
201. However, in the recast, Ireland chose not to be part of the EURODAC II Regulation.
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functioning of the Dublin regime.12 As such, the two Regulations were 
amended together in June 2013.13 
The EURODAC II Regulation entered into force on 19 July 2013 and 
was applicable from 20 July 2015 onwards.14 Currently, the EURODAC 
information system may collect and store fingerprints of three categories 
of migrants: applicants for international protection, migrants who have 
crossed the borders of the EU irregularly and are arrested, and migrants 
who have been found illegally staying within EU territory.15 Some scholars 
such as Brouwer have criticised the inclusion of illegally staying migrants 
in the EURODAC database system, highlighting the fact that fingerprint-
ing illegally staying migrants is potentially problematic.16 The author 
argues that the inclusion of categories two and three of migrants is “unac-
ceptably large” due to the fact that since these persons have not applied for 
asylum it is difficult to justify how the Dublin Convention can substanti-
ate such fingerprinting. Under the EURODAC Regulation, which specifi-
cally lists law enforcement as one of its objectives, this objection could in 
part be refuted. Nevertheless, one may not refute it completely given that, 
for example, it allows Member States’ designated authorities to compare 
Europol fingerprints collected by EURODAC with those linked with crim-
inal investigations for law enforcement purposes.17 This measure reflects 
the erosion of the purpose limitation principle, but may also consequently 
contribute to a discriminatory treatment of asylum seekers by associating 
12 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No. 603/2013 of 26 June 2013 on the estab-
lishment of “Eurodac” for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation 
(EU) No. 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State 
responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member 
States by a third-country national or a stateless person and on requests for the comparison with 
Eurodac data by Member States’ law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement 
purposes, and amending Regulation (EU) No. 1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the 
operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice 
(recast), [2013], OJ 2013, L 180/1 (hereafter EURODAC Regulation II).
13 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 of the of 26 June 2013 estab-
lishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining 
an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country 
national or a stateless person (recast), [2013], OJ 2013, L 180/31.
14 Article 46 of the EURODAC II Regulation.
15 Ibid., Articles 9 (1) and 14 (1).
16 Evelien Renate Brouwer, “Eurodac: Its limitations and temptations”, European Journal of 
Migration and Law 4 (2002): 236.
17 Article 7 (2) of the EURODAC II Regulation. 
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them with criminals, which are aspects that will be addressed in further 
detail in the sections below. 
As a consequence of the mass influx of refugees in Europe in 2015, 
frontline Member States like Greece and Italy faced numerous challenges 
including difficulties with fingerprinting all of those arriving irregularly 
at the EU, which led to thousands of migrants left without registration. 
The European Commission presented, in May 2016, a proposal for another 
recast EURODAC Regulation.18 This proposal was part of a package of 
measures that aimed to reform the Common European Asylum System. 
The main purpose of the 2016 recast EURODAC Regulation proposal was 
to mirror the changes in the proposed reform of the legal framework of 
the Common European Asylum System presented in May 2016.19 Among 
other measures, the EU Commission proposed the use of more biometric 
identifiers for EURODAC, for example, facial recognition, collection of 
digital photos and extension of the scope of this database.
Although the 2016 proposal for recasting the EURODAC Regulation is 
still at the EU negotiation table, it reflects the continuous expansion of 
EURODAC’s purpose and scope, an aspect that makes some authors ques-
tion the substantive legality of this database.20
3. EURODAC and the erosion of the purpose limitation principle 
Purpose limitation is a core principle of data protection law and applies to 
national and international rules concerning data. Article 5 of the Council 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data helps us understand the meaning of this 
principle by establishing that data automatically processed shall be: “a) 
18 Proposal for an European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No. 2016/0132 of 4 April 
2016 on the establishment of “Eurodac” for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective applica-
tion of Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining 
the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in 
one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person, for identifying an ille-
gally staying third-country national or stateless person and on requests for the comparison with 
Eurodac data by Member States’ law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement 
purposes (recast) (hereinafter Proposal 2016 recast EURODAC Regulation).
19 The Commission’s reform of the Common European Asylum System includes three propos-
als: a) amending the Dublin Regulation, b) creating the European Agency for Asylum and the c) 
reform of Eurodac system.
20 Valeria Ferraris, “Economic Migrants and Asylum Seekers in Ten Fingers: Some Reflections on 
Eurodac and Border Control”, 2017, https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-
criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2017/05/economic-migrants. 
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Obtained and processed fairly and lawfully, b) stored for specified and 
legitimate purposes and not used in a way incompatible with those pur-
poses, c) adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes 
for which they are stored, d) preserved in a form which permits identifi-
cation of data subjects for no longer than is required for the purpose for 
which those data are stored”.21
The purpose limitation principle was subsequently included in Article 6(1)
(b) of Directive 95/46,22 which once again set out that personal data should 
be acquired for specified, explicit and justified purposes. Furthermore, 
such data should not be processed in any way incompatible with these 
purposes. Article 5 b) of the General Data Protection Regulation of 2016,23 
repealing Directive 95/46, states that personal data shall be “collected for 
specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in 
a manner that is incompatible with those purposes”. As such, data must 
only be used for legitimate purposes, equivalent to a “ban on aimless data 
collection”.24 Additionally, these legitimate purposes must be specified 
before collection, and use or disclosure of the data must be compatible 
with the specified purposes. Finally, the principle of purpose limitation 
entails that data should not be retained for any period longer than neces-
sary with regard to the purposes for which it was collected and stored. 
Related developments include new information technology, biometric 
data beginning to be used and the creation of multipurpose, large-scale 
databases. At the same time, data protection has been recognised as a 
human right in accordance with Article 8 of the Charter on Fundamental 
Rights of the EU (hereinafter the Charter) and Article 8 of the European 
21 Article 5 of the Data Protection Convention.
22 European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, [1995], OJ 1995, 
L 281.
23 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No. 679/2016 of 27 April 2016 on the protec-
tion of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), [2016], OJ 
2016, L 119/1.
24 Article 5 (1) b) of the General Data Protection Regulation; Evelien Renate Brouwer, “Legality 
and data protection law: The forgotten purpose of purpose limitation”, in Leonard F. M. Besselink, 
Frans Pennings, and Sacha Prechal (eds.), The Eclipse of the Legality Principle in the European 
Union (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2011), 275, designation used by Brouwer 
when referring to the prohibition of collecting and storing personal data for unknown or not spe-
cific purposes.
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Convention of Human Rights (hereinafter ECHR).25 According to certain 
commentators, three objectives are key to the right to data protection, 
namely the protection of individual rights,26 the protection of the rule of 
law,27 and the protection of “good governance”.28 
Taking EURODAC as an example, given that it is the focus of the pre-
sent study, this database was created neither to fight irregular migration 
nor to identify an illegal stay. Rather, EURODAC is an immigration data-
base created to support the implementation of EU asylum policy and to 
perform mainly administrative tasks to guarantee the effectiveness of the 
Dublin System, as mentioned above. EURODAC’s original purpose of 
facilitating the application of the Dublin Convention was set out in the 
first version of the EURODAC Regulation.29 This formulation was retained 
in the amended EURODAC Regulation, although point 2 added to Article 
1 EURODAC II Regulation expanded the purpose of the regulation.30 This 
provision raised significant concerns, not only with regard to changing 
the original core purpose of that information system, but also to migrants’ 
fundamental rights.31 As such, Article 1 (2) EURODAC II Regulation sig-
nificantly affects the accessibility of EURODAC – expanding the number 
of bodies which have access to the biometric database that stores finger-
prints for 18 months32 or 10 years.33 Consequently, this amendment for-
malises the extension of the scope of EURODAC for law enforcement pur-
poses, which is made clear from the wording of Recitals 7, 8 and 9.34 
25 Article 8 of the ECHR and Article 8 of the Charter on Fundamental Rights of the EU.
26 Brouwer, “Legality and data protection law: The forgotten purpose of purpose limitation”, 275.
27 See the Preamble of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data, [1981], (hereafter Data Protection Convention).
28 Brouwer, “Legality and data protection law: the forgotten purpose of purpose limitation”, 275.
29 Article 1 (1) of the EURODAC I Regulation.
30 The accessibility clause, as for the purposes of this chapter, is analysed below in the next subsection.
31 European Data Protection Supervisor, European Data Protection Supervisor Press Release, 
EDPS/12/12 – “EURODAC: Erosion of fundamental rights creeps along”, Brussels, 5 September 
(2012).
32 Article 16 of the EURODAC II Regulation.
33 Article 12 of the Proposal 2016 recast EURODAC Regulation. 
34 Since 2007 the Commission alerted for the fact that the future developments of this database 
would probably focus on the use of the data for law enforcement purposes in the Report from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the evaluation of the Dublin system, 
COM 299 final and SEC 742, [2007], 11.
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It is questionable whether the more recent regulation represents a form 
of “function creep”, as some have argued.35 As one commentator has stated, 
function creep happens when “the system is being stretched in order to 
fulfil an increasing number of different types of functions than those for 
which it was originally created”.36 To take one example, personal data such 
as fingerprints stored for one specific objective might subsequently be 
made available for other purposes, such as for investigative police work. 
Moreover, an extension scope of EURODAC was recently put forward by 
the EU Commission in the 2016 recast EURODAC Regulation by includ-
ing the purpose of controlling “illegal immigration and secondary move-
ments within the Union and with the identification of illegally staying 
third-country nationals for determining the appropriate measures to be 
taken by Member States, including removal and repatriation of persons 
residing without authorisation”.37 In addition, the 2016 proposal allows 
Member States’ designated authorities and the Europol to request the com-
parison of fingerprints and facial image data stored in the Central System 
for law enforcement purposes “for the prevention, detection or investiga-
tion of terrorist offences or other criminal offences”.38 
The erosion of the purpose limitation principle, as demonstrated in the 
recent shift in the purposes and extension of scope of immigration data-
bases and, in particular, EURODAC, is central to the argument that the 
asylum seeking and irregularity of a migrant’s stay (an immigration law 
concept) and criminality (a criminal law concept) are increasingly entan-
gled in EU law and at the domestic level.39 
3.1. Law enforcement authorities’ and Europol’s access to EURODAC
The topic of the access to personal data stored in the immigration con-
trol information systems is directly related with the erosion of the pur-
pose limitation principle addressed above, and deserves being analysed by 
itself. As one commentator has remarked, “the intertwinement of crime 
35 Besters and Brom, “Greedy information technology: The digitalization of the European migra-
tion policy”, 465.
36 Broeders, “A European ‘Border’ Surveillance System”, 55.
37 Article 1 (b) of the Proposal 2016 recast EURODAC Regulation.
38 Ibid., Article 1 c).
39 For a US perspective on the phenomenon, see Stumpf, “The crimmigration crisis: Immigrants, 
crime, & sovereign power”, 386.
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control and migration control” is the definition of crimmigration,40 and 
the widening of the access to EURODAC to law enforcement authorities is 
an example of a measure that contributes to that phenomenon.
Concerns with the proportionality and necessity of these measures have 
also been raised by the European Data Protection Supervisor (hereafter 
EDPS) and in the literature.41 The expansion of the access to EURODAC to 
law enforcement authorities is, on the one hand, the most relevant exam-
ple of the extension of purpose of this database, and, on the other hand, 
supports this idea of instrumentalisation of the database for police control 
purposes. A result of the growing “surveillance society”42 is how the trust 
placed in recent technological developments affects the “outline and devel-
opment of the European migration” discourse.43 
When first adopted, the Regulation creating EURODAC did not con-
template police access or law enforcement purposes; the fingerprints that 
were collected for that database were for the sole purpose of determining 
which Member State was responsible for examining an asylum application. 
Despite the fact that EURODAC had more of a technical or administrative 
aim (namely facilitating the application of the Dublin Convention) since 
2007 the Commission, stated that the development of EURODAC would 
result in the “use of data for law enforcement purposes”.44 
The Commission’s motivation to this expansion of the access to 
EURODAC to law enforcement authorities is explained by the need to 
strengthen security in the EU due to terrorist attacks and threats and to 
make the Common European Asylum System more efficient. Although 
national law enforcement authorities’ access was only granted with the 
2015 amendments to EURODAC, since its creation there were several 
40 Joanne van der Leun, Maartje van der Woude, “A reflection on crimmigration in the 
Netherlands”, in Maria João Guia, Maartje van der Woude and Joanne van der Leun (eds.), Social 
Control and Justice – Crimmigration in the Age of Fear (Hague: Eleven International Publishing, 
2013), 43. 
41 See for example: Brouwer, “Legality and data protection law: The forgotten purpose of purpose 
limitation”.
42 Maria Tzanou, The added value of data protection as a fundamental right in the EU legal order in 
the context of law enforcement, PhD dissertation, European University Institute, Florence, 2012.
43 Besters and Brom, “Greedy information technology: The digitalization of the European migra-
tion policy”, 457.
44 Commission of the European Communities, Report from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council on the evaluation of the Dublin system, COM 299 final and SEC 742, 
June 6, 2007, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52007DC0299.
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proposals put forward aiming at the extension of the use of this database.45 
The Commission argued that enabling law enforcement authorities’ access 
to EURODAC data was in line with the prevention, detection and inves-
tigation of terrorism and other criminal offenses which were a priority 
put forward by the Hague Programme46 and would guarantee a balanced 
deal during the negotiations on the reforms of the Common European 
Asylum System. In the 2009 Impact Assessment, the EU Commission 
argued that the national and European system dealing with the collec-
tion of information on asylum seekers was inefficient and that widening 
access to EURODAC would be an important measure to contribute to the 
prevention, detection and investigation of serious crimes by law enforce-
ment authorities.47 Nevertheless, the Commission also highlighted at the 
time that, even though the involvement of asylum seekers in crime and 
terrorist activities was not significant in numbers, due to the important 
nature of these crimes their impact would be very relevant and, as such, 
access of law enforcement authorities to EURODAC would be justifiable. 
The 2012 proposal for the amendment of EURODAC was not accompanied 
by another Impact Assessment on the topic of the access of law enforce-
ment authorities and the Commission’s proposal was based on the 2009 
Impact Assessment. 
The EDPS pointed out the crucial point: that granting law enforce-
ment authorities access to EURODAC has potentially problematic conse-
quences, namely with regard to the fact that “the necessity of the intrusion 
must be supported by clear and undeniable elements, and the proportion-
ality of the processing of personal data must be demonstrated”, despite the 
legitimate exceptions to the fundamental rights to privacy and data pro-
tection.48 Simply put, using a database such as EURODAC for a different 
45 See, for example, the HL Select Committee on the European Union 40th Report (HL Paper 2005-06).
46 Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision on requesting comparisons with EURODAC 
data by Member States’ law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement pur-
poses, COM (2009) 344, September 10, 2009, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX:52009PC0344, Preamble 2 and Article 1.
47 Article 13 of the Impact Assessment (2009), Commission Staff Working Document accompanying 
the amended proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concern-
ing the establishment of EURODAC and to the proposal for a Council decision on requesting com-
parisons with EURODAC data by Member States’ law enforcement authorities and Europol for law 
enforcement purposes, SEC(2009) 936, 10.9.2009.
48 European Data Protection Supervisor Press Release, EDPS/09/11, Law enforcement access to 
EURODAC: EDPS expresses serious doubts about the legitimacy and necessity of proposed meas-
ures, Brussels, 8 of October 2009.
M&CLR_III_1.indd   167 23/05/2019   15:49:16
168  Market and Competition Law Review / volume iii / no. 1 / april 2019 / 157-183
purpose than it was originally designed may significantly assist in the fight 
against terrorism and crime as an investigative tool. However, it may also 
violate not only the principle of purpose limitation but also the legitimacy 
of the data processing. The EDPS has additionally questioned whether law 
enforcement access is necessary in the first place and has argued that the 
Commission has not shown any substantive reasons for it.49 
Nevertheless, the EURODAC II Regulation currently allows access to 
EURODAC collected data by Member States’ designated authorities and 
the Europol for law enforcement purposes.50 The amendment to Article 
1 of the EURODAC Regulation is where this inclusion can be found and, 
for the purposes of this study, will be labelled as the accessibility clause. 
The accessibility clause states that under specific conditions “Member 
States’ designated authorities and the Europol may request the compari-
son of fingerprint data for law enforcement purposes”.51 This amendment 
to EURODAC concerns for the possible violation of the principle of pur-
pose limitation and the principle of proportionality – an issue to which 
we shall return. However, before addressing that debate, a clarification 
on the relationship between the principle of purpose limitation and the 
EURODAC II Regulation’s accessibility clause is required. In reality, this 
relationship is straightforward since the amendment of the EURODAC II 
Regulation. Concerns with the violation of the principle of purpose limita-
tion were, at least in part (from a purely formal perspective), allayed when 
the Regulation expressly formalised the change of the original purpose 
49 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the amended proposal for a Regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the establishment of “Eurodac” for the 
comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation (EC) No. (.../...) (establish-
ing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an 
application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country 
national or a stateless person), and on the proposal for a Council Decision on requesting com-
parisons with Eurodac data by Member States’ law enforcement authorities and Europol for law 
enforcement purposes, OJ C 92/1, 2010, 40.
50 European Commission amended proposal for Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council (COM (2012) 254 final), on the establishment of “EURODAC” for the comparison 
of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation (EU) No. [.../...] (establishing the crite-
ria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application 
for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a 
stateless person) and to request comparisons with EURODAC data by Member States’ law enforce-
ment authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes and amending Regulation (EU) No. 
1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT sys-
tems in the area of freedom, security and justice, Brussels, 2012.
51 Article 1(2) of the EURODAC II Regulation.
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of EURODAC.52 As such, it is now expressly recognised that EURODAC 
lays down the conditions under which Member States’ designated authori-
ties and the Europol may request the comparison of fingerprint data with 
those stored in EURODAC for law enforcement purposes under certain 
conditions explained below.53
Yet, the fact that law enforcement authorities and Europol may have wide 
access to asylum seekers’ fingerprints through EURODAC raises concerns, 
as it will be shown below.54 Concerns arise not only with regard to the 
protection of personal data but also respecting the discriminatory impact 
of these measures. Is it acceptable to impose a greater level of surveillance 
on anyone subjected to EURODAC than on other migrants within the 
population? 
3.1.1.  Proportionality, necessity concerns and the access to EURODAC by law 
enforcement authorities
Firstly, it is important to note that the rights protected by the principle of 
purpose limitation in relation to the collection of biometric information, 
such as Article 8 ECHR, may allow some exceptions if the collection of 
that data is legitimate, proportionate and necessary in a democratic soci-
ety.55 The widespread access of law enforcement authorities to immigra-
tion databases may constitute an exception and in the case of EURODAC, 
for instance, should be in “accordance with the law”, “formulated with 
precision”, “necessary in a democratic society to protect legitimate and 
proportionate aim and proportionate to the legitimate objective aims to 
achieve”.56
In the S. & Marper v. United Kingdom case,57 the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) took a particular stance regarding the limits of 
the collection and protection of biometrical data. In this case, the ECtHR 
found that the applicants were subjected to discriminatory treatment and 
a disproportionate restriction on their right to privacy. The applicants, Mr. 
S and Mr. Marper, were suspected of having committed a criminal offence 
52 Recital 13 of the EURODAC II Regulation.
53 Recital 13 and Article 1 (2) of the EURODAC II Regulation.
54 See Article 1 (2) of the EURODAC II Regulation.
55 Article 8 (2) ECHR. 
56 Recital 13 of the EURODAC II Regulation. 
57 S & Marper v. United Kingdom, ECtHR (2008) ECHR 1581, (2008) 158 NLJ 1755, (2009) 48 EHRR 
50, 25 BHRC 557, [2009] Crim LR 355, Appl. no. 30562/04, 30566/04, judgment of 4 December 
2008, paragraph 127 and see also Articles 8 and 14 ECHR.
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and had their fingerprints and DNA collected, although they were never 
convicted of any such crime. The applicants had attempted to secure the 
destruction of the samples of data but had had their requests refused by 
UK national authorities. In this particular case, the ECtHR made a crucial 
point in order to understand the significance of this type of data and its 
potential effects. The Court confirmed that biometric data contains unique 
information about the individual capable of affecting their private life.58 As 
such, the European Court of Human Rights sought to assess whether the 
restriction on the applicants’ right to privacy was i) in accordance with law, 
ii) had a legitimate aim, and iii) was necessary in a democratic society. The 
Court found that it was not acceptable and that “the nature of the powers 
of retention of the fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA of persons sus-
pected but not convicted of offences”59 was discriminatory. As a result, the 
retention of Mr. S and Mr. Marper’s personal data constituted an interfer-
ence with their right to respect for private life. 
Comparing the reasoning in this decision with the enhancement of the 
access to EURODAC by law enforcement authorities, it would appear that 
standards were not taken into account. Essentially, an asylum seeker who 
has entered the EU and lodged a claim would have to allow the collec-
tion and retention of their biometric data and its access to law enforce-
ment authorities independently of the fact of having or not been convicted 
for committing a crime.60 This feature, effectively, brings together asylum 
seeking, potential illegality (if the claim is refused or if the individual 
is an irregular migrant stopped at the border) and criminality; this is a 
conflation that by itself raises questions of proportionality, necessity and 
non-discrimination. 
Additionally, the debate regarding restriction of purpose limitation has 
already been the topic of discussion in the Huber v. Germany case before the 
CJEU.61 The first case dealt with the interpretation of the Data Protection 
Directive 95/46 EC and the second with the relationship between the 
58 Ibid., paragraph 84, emphasis added.
59 Ibid., paragraph 127.
60 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the amended proposal for a Regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the establishment of “EURODAC” for the com-
parison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation (EU) No. [.../...] [...] (Recast ver-
sion), 2012, point 38. 
61 Judgment of 16 December 2008, Huber v. Germany, C-524/06, EU:C:2008:724 and Judgment 
of 20 May 2003, Rechnungshof v. Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others C-465/00, C-138/01, 
C-139/01, EU:C:2003:294.
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principle of purpose limitation and non-discrimination. These cases are 
important benchmarks of the jurisprudence of the CJEU in relation to the 
regulation of individuals’ personal data and are helpful counter examples 
with regard to what has been said about the latest widening of the access to 
immigration databases. 
As an EU citizen exercising his right of free movement, Mr. Huber con-
sidered that such collection and retention of personal data was in viola-
tion of Article 18 TFEU prohibiting the discrimination of EU citizens and 
Directive 2004/38 on the free movement of EU citizens and their fam-
ily members. Three questions were referred to the CJEU by the German 
administrative court. The first question concerned the processing of per-
sonal data for the purposes of the application of the legislation relating to 
the right of residence, and the second for statistical purposes. Whereas 
the Court considered that the collection and retention of such data was 
necessary for the purposes of contributing to a more effective application 
of the legislation as regards the right to reside,62 it decided the opposite 
and declared that in relation to the statistical purposes claim the necessity 
requirement was not met. The third question is the most relevant for this 
analysis, as it concerned the storage of personal data relating to EU citizens 
for the purposes of fighting crime. The CJEU held that in this case there 
was a violation of the principle of non-discrimination posited in Article 
18 TFEU. For the Court, in a Member State, “the situation of its nationals 
cannot, as regards the objective of fighting crime, be different from that of 
Union citizens who are nationals of the Member State and who are resident 
in its territory”.63
The Huber v. Germany decision plays an important role in understand-
ing, even if by analogy, the potential discriminatory effects that processing 
data for different purposes may have on the individuals monitored.64 If, in 
the words of the Court, there is discriminatory treatment of individuals, 
if the “difference of the treatment arises by virtue of the systemic process-
ing of personal data relating only to Union citizens who are not nation-
als of the Member State concerned for the purposes of fighting crime”,65 
62 Judgment of 16 December 2008, Huber v. Germany, C-524/06, EU:C:2008:724, paragraph 62.
63 Judgment of 16 December 2008, Huber v. Germany, C-524/06, EU:C:2008:724, paragraph 79.
64 Joanna Parkin, “The difficult road to the Schengen Information System II: The legacy of ‘labo-
ratories’ and the cost for fundamental rights and the rule of law”, CEPS Liberty and Security in 
Europe 29 (2011).
65 Paragraph 80 of the Huber judgment.
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could we say that by analogy the same effect may occur with regard to 
third-country nationals? Although the decision under analysis focused 
on the processing of personal data of EU citizens and not specifically on 
third-country nationals, the core aspect of the analogy is not the category 
of people these migrants may belong to, but rather the fact that in these 
two scenarios a group of people is treated unequally with regard to the 
processing of personal data that allows the creation of connection with the 
practice of criminal activities. 
In other words, the “unpleasant shadow” mentioned by Advocate-
General Poiares Maduro in his Opinion “perpetuates the distinction 
between ‘us’ – the natives – and ‘them’ – the foreigners”,66 and the same 
thing could by analogy be said about the monitoring of asylum seekers 
for law enforcement purposes. In practical terms, if an information sys-
tem that treats EU citizens differently in respect of their nationality for the 
purposes of fighting crime can potentially have stigmatising effects, then 
the fact that different categories of third-country nationals may be reg-
istered in different databases (with or without law enforcement, depend-
ing on their origin or claim) can arguably also have the same effects.67 
For instance, as regards EURODAC, one may question whether there is 
an implicit differential treatment imposed on asylum seekers and irregu-
lar migrants registered on that database and other categories of migrants. 
These are issues that raise concerns in what respects the necessity of differ-
ent treatment and the proportionality of these measures when there is no 
strong link between a specific group of people and crime. 
In short, a database like EURODAC, which was originally created with 
an administrative purpose, may in practice work as an intelligence tool,68 
raising concerns with regard to the proportionality and necessity of the 
means used to achieve the aim proposed. These proportionality and neces-
sity concerns are, for instance, balanced by the conditions imposed by the 
EURODAC Regulation II to law enforcement authorities to access the 
information storage by the database. These conditions aim at guarantee-
ing the protection of the fundamental right to respect for the private life of 
individuals whose personal data is collected by EURODAC. 
66 Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro delivered on 3 April 2008, Huber v. Germany, 
C-524/06, EU:C:2008:194, paragraph 15.
67 For example someone registered in EURODAC and someone not registered in that database.
68 Boehm, Information Sharing and Data Protection in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 
292.
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Firstly, and before requesting access to EURODAC data, the desig-
nated national authorities must review the national fingerprint databases, 
the automated fingerprinting identification systems of all other Member 
States under Decision 2008/615/JHA, and VIS.69 Secondly, the comparison 
must be “necessary for the purpose of the prevention, detection or inves-
tigation of terrorist offences or of other serious criminal offences, which 
means that there is an overriding public security concern which makes the 
searching of the database proportionate”.70 Europol’s conditions for access 
to EURODAC are considerably looser and for instance there is no request 
for a first check of other databases before Europol’s designated authority 
submits a reasoned electronic request for the comparison of fingerprint 
data with the data stored in the Central System.71 In addition to these and 
to the requirements for the quality of the data,72 other data protection safe-
guards are established by the EURODAC Regulation II, such as, for exam-
ple, the supervision of the data protection being carried out by the EDPS 
and the national law enforcement authorities.
The trend of the enhancement of the access of law enforcement authori-
ties to immigration databases is a reality confirmed by the EURODAC 
Regulation II and reaffirmed by the changes put forward by the EU 
Commission in the 2016 recast EURODAC Regulation, which would, for 
example, allow law enforcement authorities to check on migrants’ second-
ary movements in the EU’s territory or give partial access to the authori-
ties of third countries subject to certain conditions. The Council of the 
European Union has argued during the negotiations of the 2016 recast 
EURODAC Regulation that a “broader and simpler access of law enforce-
ment authorities of the Member States to Eurodac may, while guaranteeing 
the full respect of the fundamental rights, enable Member States to use 
all existing tools to ensure that people live in an area of freedom, secu-
rity and justice”.73 Expanding the scope and simplifying law enforcement 
69 Article 20 of the EURODAC II Regulation.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., Article 21.
72 Ibid., Articles 23 to 25.
73 Council of the European Union, 10079/17, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the establishment of “Eurodac” for the comparison of biometric data for the 
effective application of Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection 
lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person, for identifying 
an illegally staying third-country national or stateless person and on requests for the comparison 
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access to EURODAC is, for EU institutions, a tool to “help Member States 
dealing with the increasingly complicated operational situations and cases 
involving cross-border crimes and terrorism with direct impact on the 
security situation in the EU”.74 
The necessity to maintain security in Europe and to overcome the gaps 
in the registration of asylum seekers and migrants (in particular difficul-
ties with fingerprinting) revealed since the mass influx of migrants to the 
European Union in 2015 motivated the amendments for the expansion of 
the scope of and access to EURODAC. Nevertheless, the concerns with the 
violation of data protection, privacy and discrimination of asylum seekers 
and irregular migrants are also tangible, despite the safeguards that the 
EURODAC system imposes, since with broader access to the stored data 
comes greater responsibility to the designated law enforcement authorities 
in avoiding this group of migrants being treated as potential lawbreakers.
3.2. EURODAC: biometric borders?
EURODAC’s biometric system currently collects ten fingerprints from asy-
lum seekers and migrants aged 14 and older (the 2016 recast EURODAC 
Regulation proposal suggests lowering the age to 6 years old).75 The data 
collected includes fingerprint data, Member State of origin, place and date 
of the application for international protection, gender, date on which the 
fingerprints were taken, and the reference number used by the Member 
State of origin, among other aspects.76 Therefore, in accordance with the 
current regime, the individual’s name or place of birth is not collected; 
however, it is possible to link the information stored in the system to a per-
son due to the reference number used by the Member State of origin. The 
2016 recast EURODAC Regulation proposal puts forward the possibility of 
storing names, nationalities and facial images, as mentioned above, which 
shows that not only the purpose of the database is broadened, but also 
the type of data it stores. There are several reasons why biometric systems 
use fingerprints: they are easy to collect and not easily modified by illness 
with Eurodac data by Member States’ law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement 
purposes, and amending Regulation (EU) 1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the opera-
tional management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (recast), 
(COM(2016)0272 – C( - 0179/2016 – 2016/0132(COD)) Brussels, 12 June 2017.
74 Ibid., point 22 a.
75 Ibid., Articles 9 and 14.
76 Ibid., Article 11. 
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or ageing, for example.77 Public security concerns and counter terrorism 
measures are reasons that justify the resource and willingness to expand 
the use of biometric data as it contributes to make “asylum proceedings 
easier and faster”.78
Several concerns have been raised in the literature regarding the inclu-
sion of biometric data in SIS II, which are also shared when one thinks 
of the application of VIS and EURODAC.79 The EDPS pointed out in his 
Opinion on the draft SIS II legislation: “(…) the tendency to use biomet-
ric data in EU wide information systems (VIS, EURODAC, Information 
System on driving licences, etc.) is growing steadfastly, but is not accompa-
nied by a careful consideration of risks involved and required safeguards”.80
The lack of consideration of the risks involved, as the EDPS put it, intrin-
sically relates to the risk of lack of accuracy that may result from a biom-
etric search. Problems with accuracy are probably the greatest weakness 
of the use of biometrics.81 Biometrics is a sophisticated means of identifi-
cation of people, and the use of biometric data is a very valuable tool for 
identity control, although it can also negatively affect their legal position 
if there is any failure in the procedure. The EDPS argued that in case of 
failure to register the fingerprints of an asylum seeker due to, for example, 
an incorrect identification this should not lead to a rejection or refusal of 
his or her application.82 In relation to biometrical data, the CJEU stated 
in 2013 in the Schwarz decision that although the taking and storing of 
77 Lehte Roots, “The new EURODAC regulation: Fingerprints as a source of informal discrimina-
tion”, Baltic Journal of European Studies Tallinn University of Technology 5, no. 2 (2015): 111.
78 Ibid., 112.
79 Ibid., 53. Tzanou, “The added value of data protection as a fundamental right in the EU legal 
order in the context of law enforcement”, 199-203; Peers, Guild and Tomkin, EU Immigration and 
Asylum Law, 114, Besters and Brom, “Greedy information technology: The digitalization of the 
European migration policy”, 458-459. In relation to VIS and the use of biometrics: Baldaccini, 
“Counter-terrorism and the EU strategy for border security: Framing suspects with biometric 
documents and databases”, 38 and 49.
80 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the draft SIS II legislation, OJ 91/38, 
2006, point 4.1, and Memorandum by the Meijers Committee, House of Lords European Union 
Commitee, Schengen Information System II (SIS II), 10 of July 2006, 4, (http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldeucom/49/6101107.htm).
81 Yue Liu, “Scenario study of biometric systems at borders”, Computer Law & Security Review 36 
(2011): 42.
82 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the amended proposal for a Regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the establishment of “EURODAC” for the com-
parison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation (EU) No. [.../...] [...] (Recast ver-
sion), 2012, 17.
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fingerprints by the nationals authorities “constitutes a threat to the rights 
to respect for private life and the protection of personal data”, it must nev-
ertheless be assessed if that measure is justified.83 The unique nature of 
biometric data, which allows a more precise identification of individuals, 
was already stressed above when discussing the S. & Marper case – a point 
also made by the CJEU – and, for that reason, requires additional concerns 
as regards the necessity and proportionality of its usage.84 
Other critiques are also commonly put forward in relation to the use of 
biometrical data. Firstly, there is the risk that criminal organisations may 
have easier access to biometrical data and misuse or manipulate it, as well 
as of an increase in identity theft.85 Secondly, one may also think of the 
possibility of transforming EU databases into systems used by law enforce-
ment authorities as profiling tools. Thirdly, the risk of biometrics misuse 
rises when the data is stored in a centralised database, such as EURODAC, 
due to the fact that there is a bigger risk of unlawful access to the infor-
mation.86 Lastly, it has been pointed out that the recourse to technology 
may lead to the “dehumanization of individuals via the instrumentaliza-
tion of the human body”, contributing to the practice of asylum-seekers 
deliberately mutilating their fingerprints, and to providing the States with 
personal data that can be accessed in different instances.87 
The 2016 recast EURODAC Regulation proposal introduces the require-
ment to store facial images in addition to fingerprints to overcome certain 
difficulties encountered by Member States with the fingerprinting of appli-
cants and to speed up the process, even though the comparison of facial 
images without fingerprints should be a last resource measure for Member 
States.88 This inclusion on the EURODAC Regulation proposal reflects the 
need to establish a division between solutions that aim to address admin-
istrative issues such as the failure of fingerprinting and the necessity of 
83 Judgment of 17 October 2013, Michael Schwarz v. Stadt Bochum, C-291/12, EU:C:2013:670, para-
graph 23.
84 Ibid., paragraph 27.
85 Steve Peers, Elspeth Guild and Jonathan Tomkin, EU Immigration and Asylum Law (Brill, 
2012), 116.
86 Roots, “The new EURODAC regulation: Fingerprints as a source of informal discrimination”, 126.
87 Valsamis Mitsilegas, “Immigration control in an era of globalization: Deflecting foreigners, 
weakening citizens, strengthening the State”, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 19, (2012): 
37, and for more in the same topic see Huub Dijstelbloem, “Europe’s new technological gatekeeper. 
Debating the deployment of technology in migration policy”, Amsterdam Law Forum 1 (2009), 
http://amsterdamlawforum.org/article/view/90/154.
88 Recital 10 and Articles 2 (1) and 16 (1) of the 2016 recast EURODAC Regulation proposal.
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collecting more biometrics identifiers, in this case by EURODAC, at the 
risk of disrespecting Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. Against this scenario, Aas’ view is even more relevant: “the body 
becomes, in a sense, a passport or a password and an unambiguous token 
of truth”,89 immigration control databases coincide with the concept of 
borders as these are in the end tools for the categorisation of migrants. 
In the case of asylum seekers, “the traveller embodies the border”90 and 
EURODAC is foremost an example of the establishment of a personalised 
(and digital) border.
4. The impact of the development of EURODAC in EU Migration Law
After analysing in specific the most recent amendments to the EU asy-
lum fingerprinting system vis-à-vis the principle of purpose limitation, 
and the proportionality and necessity of the expansion of the scope of the 
EURODAC biometric database, two main aspects within EU migration 
can be highlighted: the potential criminalisation and stigmatisation of 
asylum seekers and irregular migrants and the securitisation of EU migra-
tion law. 
Firstly, the criminalisation of irregular migrants is not an isolated trend 
in the domestic immigration law of any particular State. In fact, this phe-
nomenon is a “widespread trend all over the world”.91 Criminal law that 
prosecutes immigration offences is a key aspect of the criminalisation of 
migration.92 Throughout this study it has been argued that the fact that 
asylum seekers and irregular migrants whose biometric data is collected 
by EURODAC and accessed by national and European law enforcement 
authorities puts this group of travelers under greater suspicion than oth-
ers whose data will not be requested to compare for criminal purposes. 
Yet, this practice is neither an express or substantive criminalising meas-
ure, nor is it illegal or discriminatory per se. Law enforcement authorities’ 
access to the EURODAC system serves legitimate goals such as the preven-
tion, detection or investigation of terrorist offences or other serious crimi-
nal offences; yet, it is important to understand that there are implications 
89 Katja Franko Aas, “‘The body does not lie’: Identity, risk and trust in technoculture”, Crime, 
Media, Culture 2 (2006): 145.
90 Ferraris, “Economic migrants and asylum seekers in ten fingers: Some reflections on Eurodac 
and border control”, 5.
91 Franziska Boehm, Information Sharing and Data Protection in the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice (Springer, 2011), 280.
92 Valsamis Mitsilegas, The Criminalisation of Migration in Europe (Springer, 2015), 77.
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and a “high risk” of treating asylum seekers as criminals if control over the 
access to this data is not exerted in a rigorous way.93
Another aspect that contributes to the stigmatisation of asylum seekers 
and irregular migrants, and which is a consequence of the modus oper-
andi of the immigration databases, in particular of EURODAC, is a dep-
ersonalisation of the individuals whose data is stored. With regard to the 
depersonalisation of migrants, it can be said that this has a generalising 
effect (or profiling) of categorising people in a manner not regulated by 
law. The depersonalisation of mobile individuals is related to the creation 
of migrant profiles such as “the suspected” or “mala fide”, the “trusted” 
or “bona fide traveller”,94 or the “crimmigrant”.95 This trend has a strong 
stigmatising effect on migrants categorising them ab initio and socially 
excluding individuals who are not a perfect fit for these profiles. As such, 
the personal element loses its relevance: “the migration machine by its 
nature tends to dehumanize the people it needs to process”.96 
Secondly, and equally important, is the recent development of the 
framework of immigration databases which has led to the enhancement of 
migration governance securitisation. With regard to the issue of the way 
EU immigration databases shape, for example, the illegality of one’s stay, 
it is safe to argue that the prevalence of surveillance in its framework is 
enough to say that, once more, the status of illegality has not developed 
completely independently from security concerns. 
This issue is particularly important when one examines EURODAC’s 
shift for a broader and more securitarian purpose which allows access to 
biometric data for security purposes, but this is also true in what regards 
EUROSUR. The EUROSUR Regulation was approved by the European 
Parliament in October 2013 and applicable from December 2013 in certain 
Member States.97 EUROSUR’s purpose is established in Article 1 of the 
93 Roots, “The New EURODAC Regulation: Fingerprints as a Source of Informal Discrimination”, 125.
94 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the Regions on migration, 2011, point 34. 
95 Katja Franko Aas, “Crimmigrant’ bodies and bona fide travelers: Surveillance, citizenship and 
global governance”, Theoretical Criminology 15, no. 3 (2011), 336 and 338.
96 Huub Dijstelbloem and Albert Meijer, “Reclaiming control over Europe’s technological bor-
ders”, in Huub Dijstelbloem and Albert Meijer, Migration and the New Technological Borders of 
Europe. (Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), 184.
97 In Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia and Finland. In the remaining Member 
States, EUROSUR was applicable since 1 December 2014.
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Regulation as “detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration 
and cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring the protection and 
saving the lives of migrants”.98 EUROSUR does pursue the humanitarian 
purpose of protecting and saving migrants’ lives and it stresses the need to 
comply with fundamental rights and to prioritise vulnerable groups; yet, 
how this could be achieved is not described in the Regulation.
Contrariwise, the EUROSUR Regulation places a stronger emphasis 
on the issue of surveillance. In fact, the Commission’s proposal of 2011 
included a reference to migrant profiling establishing that the national sit-
uational picture “shall contain migrant profiles, routes, information on the 
impact levels attributed to the external land and sea border sections and 
facilitation analysis”.99 This formulation was later excluded from the final 
version of the EUROSUR Regulation, Article 5(3)(b) of which ensures “the 
timely exchange of information with search and rescue, law enforcement, 
asylum and immigration authorities at national level”. Mitsilegas argues 
that merging “the logic of risk prevention with the logic of border security” 
in relation to these new models of surveillance may have implications for 
the protection of fundamental rights, in particular with regard to asylum 
seekers and to “the relationship between the individual and the state”.100 
Thus, it can be argued that it is not only those databases already estab-
lished, such as EURODAC, that view information technology systems as 
identification tools with a particular focus on the removal of migrants, on 
impeding their entrance or law enforcement purposes, but also the new 
generation of immigration databases (for example EUROSUR), which fol-
low the same archetype despite their humanitarian concerns.
5. Conclusion 
What can be concluded from the most recent EU strategy for border 
control asylum information systems? The fact that one can identify the 
trends previously addressed as factors of the conflation of asylum seeking 
and criminality in recent proposals and amendments of the EURODAC 
98 European Parliament and Council Regulation of the (EU) No. 1052/2013 establishing the 
European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), [2013], OJ L295/1.
99 Article 6 c) of the European Commission proposal for a Regulation establishing the European 
Border Surveillance System (COM (2011) 0873) and Meijers Committee for a Regulation establish-
ing the European Border Surveillance (COM (2011) 0873), CM1215, 12 September 2012, 1 and 4. 
100 Valsamis Mitsilegas, “The borders paradox: The surveillance of movement in a Union without 
internal frontiers”, A Right to Inclusion and Exclusion? Normative Faultlines of the EU’s Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, Hans Lindahl (eds.), (Hart, 2009), 61.
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Regulation reflects a common premise of the present study: the potential 
digital criminalisation and stigmatisation of asylum seekers and illegally 
staying migrants. This scenario is illustrative of the so-called crimmigra-
tion phenomenon.101 There is a clear trend identified by the literature of 
criminalising immigration offenses at a national level in the EU,102 and 
this study aimed to show how, at the level of the management of supra-
national structures of surveillance in the area of justice and home affairs, 
especially with regard to EURODAC, some practices can potentially lead 
to the same (criminalising) result at the EU level.
The fact that the EU system of surveillance puts some categories of 
mobile people under greater surveillance than others is clear for all to see. 
The story of mass surveillance and digital borders continues to be writ-
ten under the premise that irregularity and criminality can be put under 
the same degree of suspicion, as we have seen, for instance, with regard to 
asylum seekers and irregular migrants, whose fingerprints are collected 
by the EURODAC system, to which national law enforcement authorities 
and Europol are gradually gaining broader and simpler access. This is so 
regardless of the legitimate goals that the Commission aims to achieve, 
such as facilitating the application of the Dublin system, in particular after 
the 2015 mass influx of asylum seekers in the EU. 
At the centre of this study is the idea that EU instruments in charge 
of regulating EU immigration databases influence the legal regime and 
the categorisation of asylum seekers and irregular migrants. In relation 
to the changes and the recent proposal for amendment of the EURODAC 
Regulation, this argument was evidenced by three main trends common 
to these databases: the erosion of the principle of purpose limitation, the 
widening of access to data by law enforcement authorities, and the impact 
of the digitalisation of borders through biometrics. 
Since 2017, trilogues are ongoing on the amendment of EURODAC 
proposed in 2016 by the EU Commission, guaranteeing not only that the 
system respects the fundamental rights of migrants, but also the princi-
ples of data protection are a priority of the co-legislators. Whereas a pro-
visional agreement between the Parliament and the Council was reached 
in June 2018 regarding the storage of fingerprints, facial images and 
alphanumeric data of asylum seekers and irregular migrants, the age for 
101 Ibid., 379.
102 Perrine Dumas, L’Accès des Ressortissants des Pays Tiers au Territoire des États Membres de 
l’Union Européenne (Bruylant, 2013), 310.
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obtaining fingerprints lowered to 6 years old, and a more efficient access 
to the database by Europol, it is crucial to guarantee a reinforced supervi-
sion of the treatment of this data and of the way it is collected at a national 
level. Taking into consideration the scope of other changes put forward by 
the 2016 EURODAC proposal, for example, giving the authorities of third 
countries partial access under certain conditions and the use of detention 
and coercion as last resort to ensure the fingerprinting of migrants, the EU 
has the duty to reinforce safeguards to guarantee the respect for the fun-
damental rights of the people involved in these procedures in the reception 
facilities, in particular at the national level.103 
Trying to address the reform of the Dublin system through continuously 
expanding the purpose and access to what should be an administrative 
tool such as EURODAC will only result in a temporary quick fix to an 
asylum system that needs a structural reform. The trends that result from 
EURODAC’s framework impact on EU Migration Law, namely the stig-
matisation of asylum seekers and irregular migrants and the securitisation 
of EU migration can be found also in the EU’s new surveillance initia-
tives, such as the EUROSUR (the European Border Surveillance System). If 
these are continuously reproduced, the potential criminalisation and stig-
matization will continue to represent one of the biggest challenges of the 
EU policy Agenda. The risk of amending the European Common Asylum 
System based on these trends is a dangerous one and a high price to pay 
in terms of the protection of the fundamental rights of asylum seekers and 
irregular migrants. 
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